Murder, Inc.: The Criminal Liability of
Corporations for Homicide
I.

INTRODUCTION

Fire swept through the Haunted Mansion at Six Flags Corporation's Great Adventure amusement park in Jackson Town-

ship, New Jersey on May 11, 1984, resulting in the death of eight
teenagers.' The Ocean County Prosecutor's Office launched a
criminal investigation which led to a special grand jury indictment for manslaughter against Six Flags Corporation, Great Adventure, Inc., and two individuals. 2 Following a lengthy jury trial,
the two corporations were acquitted in 1985.'
The Six Flags case represents a current trend in homicide
cases towards prosecution of corporations instead of, or in addition to, individuals.4 The growth of this trend has been unaccompanied by any discernible rationale as many of the modern
cases accept, without discussion, corporate criminal liability for
manslaughter as a well-settled concept.5 The criminal law has
followed an erratic and often unreasoned path from the proposition that a corporation could not commit any crime, to the modern notion that a corporation is capable of manslaughter. ° As
such, the purpose of this comment is first to trace the developI Asbury Park Press, May 12, 1984, at 1, col. 4.
2 Indictment, State v. Six Flags Corp., No. 1-0650-9-84 (NJ. Super. filed Sept.
14, 1984).
3 N.Y. Times, July 21, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
4 See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
5 See Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. Prrr. L. REV. 21 (1957). Professor Mueller described the development of criminal liability of corporations as
follows:
Many weeds have grown on the acre of jurisprudence which has been
allotted to the criminal law. Among these weeds is a hybrid of vicarious
liability, absolute liability, an inkling of mens rea - though a rather degenerated mens rea -, a few genes from tort law and a few from the law
of business associations. This weed is called coporate criminal liability
(herba responsibilitas corporationis M., for those who prefer the botanical
term). Nobody bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody planted it. It just
grew. To be quite sure, it has not done much harm; at least nobody has
established any harmful results stemming from its mere existence, so
that some may well wish to conclude upon its usefulness. Has itdone
any good? Again, nobody knows, though the farmers.of the law have
formed many opinions, all resting on rather educated agronomic
conjecture.
Id.
6 Id. at 22-23.
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ment of corporate criminal liability for homicide and, second, to
examine the social utility of prosecuting corporations rather than
individuals.
II.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Early Cases: 1613-1890.

A.

Early common law courts did not recognize criminal liability
of corporations for any offense.7 Explaining the rationale for this
position, the Court of the King's Bench in 1613 stated in dictum
in In re Sutton's Hospital8 that corporations were incapable of certain crimes because "they have no souls." I Sutton's Hospital was
not a criminal action, but rather a civil trespass suit arising out of
a conveyance of real property to a corporation.' 0 The plaintiff,
an heir of Thomas Sutton, claimed title to land which Sutton had
conveyed to a corporation established for hospital purposes prior
to his death. The issue of ownership turned in part upon
whether a hospital could properly be incorporated prior to the
actual establishment of the hospital." The court held that a proposed hospital would "be sufficient to support the name of an
incorporation when the corporation itself [exists] only in the abstract."' 2 The court, in order to emphasize the abstract nature of
a corporation, went on to catalogue a number of acts, both criminal and non-criminal, which a corporate entity could not
perform. 13

At the beginning of the next century, the concept set forth in
the Sutton's Hospital dictum was adopted in an anonymous case
decided by Chief Justice Holt. 4 Lord Holt's remarkably concise
opinion stated in its entirety that "[a] corporation is not indicta7 See Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518, 12 Mod. 559 (K.B. 1702); In re Sutton's
Hospital, 77 Eng. Rep. 937 (K.B. 1613); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 476-77.

8 77 Eng. Rep. 937 (K.B. 1613).
9 Id. at 973.
10 Id. at 961.
''

Id. at 961, 973.

12 Id. at 973.

13 Id. The court noted, inter alia, that a corporation "is invisible, immortal, and
Id. The court further
rests only in intendment and consideration of the law ....
noted that corporations "cannot commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor excommu-

nicate [nor] can they appear in person, but by attorney .... [They] cannot do fealty
for an invisible body can neither be in person, nor swear [and they are] not subject
to imbecilities, death of the natural body, and divers[e] other cases." Id. (citations
omitted).

14 Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518, 12 Mod. 559 (K.B. 1702).
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ble, but the particular members of it are."' 5 A number of later
courts, however, declined to follow the opinion, with some treating it as dictum' 6 and others doubting its authenticity.'

7

Never-

theless, defense attorneys occasionally cited the opinion during
the eighteenth century, despite its questionable genesis and lack
8
of explanatory facts and reasoning.'
By the mid-nineteenth century, courts gradually accepted
the concept of corporate criminal liability in limited circumstances.' 9 In Regina v. Birmingham & Gloucester Railway,20 the court
held that a corporation could be indicted for nonfeasance 2 '
where the corporation was held in contempt of a court order to
construct a bridge. 2 The prosecution's primary objective, how23
ever, was not to punish but to coerce the corporation to act.
The Queen's Bench expanded upon Birmingham & Gloucester in
the case of Regina v. Great North of England Railway,24 holding that
a corporation could be indicted for misfeasance. 25 The indict15 Id.
16 See Regina v. Great N. of Eng. Ry., 72 Rev. Rep. 262, 264, 9 QB. 315, 319
(1846). See also infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
17 See State v. Morris & E. R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360 (Sup. Ct. 1852). In Morris & E.
R. R. Chief Justice Green commented:
It may well be doubted whether this is not one of those cases which
extorted from Lord Holt the bitter complaint of his reporters, "that the
stuff which they published would make posterity think ill of his understanding, and that of his brethren on the bench." Aside from the
apochryphal character of the report, it is hardly credible that so learned
and accurate a judge as Lord Holt should have laid down the broad
proposition imputed to him by his reporter.
Id. at 364.
18 See, e.g., Great N. of Eng. Ry. , 72 Rev. Rep. at 264, 9 Q.B. at 319. In that case,
the defense counsel stated that "[tihe dictum of HOLT, CH. J, in an Anonymous case in
Modern Reports, will be relied upon for the defendants," while acknowledging that
"[i]t does not appear what the facts there were, nor whether the indictment was for
a misfeasance or a nonfeasance." Id. (citation omitted).
19 See, e.g. State v. Morris & E. R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360 (1852); Regina v. Great N. of
Eng. Ry., 72 Rev. Rep. 262, 269, 9 Q.B. 315, 326; Regina v. Birmingham & G. Ry.,
61 Rev. Rep. 207, 3 Q.B. 223 (1842).
20 61 Rev. Rep. 207, 3 Q.B. 223 (1842).
21 See id. at 215, 3 Q.B. at 233. "Nonfeasance" is defined as the "[n]onperformance of some act which ought to be performed, omission to perform a required duty at all, or total neglect of duty." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 950 (5th ed.
1979) Nonfeasance should be distinguished from malfeasance. See infra note 25.
22 Birmingham & G. Ry., 61 Rev. Rep. at 208, 3 Q.B. at 223.
23 See id. at 215, 3 Q.B. at 233.
24 72 Rev. Rep. 262, 9 Q.B. 315 (1846).
25 Id. at 269, 9 Q.B. at 326. "Malfeasance" is defined as:
[A] wrongful act which the actor has no legal right to do, or any wrongful conduct which affects, interrupts, or interferes with performance of
official duty, or an act for which there is no authority or warrant of law
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ment alleged that the Great North of England Railway Company.
had constructed a bridge in such a way that it obstructed a nearby
public highway, thus creating a nuisance.2 6 Lord Denman, writing for the court, saw no reason to distinguish between corporate
nonfeasance and malfeasance. 2 7 He noted that while the court in
Birmingham & Gloucester had specifically addressed nonfeasance,
the decision "was by no means intended to deny the liability of a
corporation for a misfeasance. "28 Here, the sovereign's purpose
in bringing the action was not only to punish the corporation, but
to compel it to remedy the defects of the bridge.2 9
As early as 1837, New Jersey enacted a statute which provided a mechanism for the indictment of corporations. 3 0 The
statute, however, did not specify the offenses for which a corporation could be indicted. 3 ' This question was not addressed in
New Jersey until 1852 when the supreme court held in State v.
Morris & Essex Railroad32 that a corporation could be indicted for
the creation of nuisance. 33 The facts of Morris & Essex resembled
those of Great North of England in that the indictment charged the
corporation with constructing a building on a public highway,
"thereby creating a nuisance and obstruction to the free use of
official duty, or an act for which there is no authority or warrant of law
or which a person ought not to do at all, or the unjust performance of
some act, which [the] party performing it has no right, or has contracted
not, to do.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 862 (5th ed. 1979).
26 Great N. of Eng. Ry., 72 Rev. Rep. at 262-63, 9 Q.B. at 315-17.
27 Id. at 269-70, 9 Q.B. at 326.
28 Id.
29 See id. at 269-70, 9 Q.B. at 326-27. With regard to the argument that criminal
proceedings should be directed at either to the individuals who gave the wrongful
order or to those who carried it out, Lord Denmore observed:
We are told that this remedy is not required, because the individuals who concur in voting the order, or in executing the work, may be
made answerable for it by criminal proceedings. Of this there is no
doubt. But the public knows nothing of the former; and the latter, if
they can be identified, are commonly persons of the lowest rank, wholly
incompetent to make any reparation for the injury. There can be no effectual means for deterring from an oppressive exercise of power for the
purpose of gain, except the remedy by an indictment against those who
truly commit it, that is, the corporation, acting by its majority ....
Id. at 270, 9 Q.B. at 326-27 (emphasis added).
30 Act of February 10, 1837, 1837 N.J. Acts 125. The statute provided in pertinent part, that a summons could be issued to a corporation in its corporate name,
and that the summons could be served on a corporate president, officer or director.
Id. § 1, 1837 N.J. Acts at 125.
31 See id.
32 23 N.J.L. 360 (Sup. Ct. 1852).
33 See id. at 371-72.
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said highway." ' 34 The supreme court noted in dictum that a corporation could not be held liable for certain crimes, including
homicide, as there was no suitable punishment and corporations
lacked capacity to form an evil intent.35 ChiefJustice Green observed, however, that such obstacles would not punish or bar
corporate criminal liability for nuisance, rather its primary purpose would compel the corporation to remedy the situation.36
State v. Gilmore3 7 was the first case to hold a corporation criminally liable for a wrongful death, but, as with the criminal prosecutions in Birmingham & Gloucester, Great North of England, and

Morris & Essex, the object was not to punish the corporate entity
but rather to make reparations." New Hampshire had enacted a
statute in 1850 which provided that if a person died due to a railroad's negligence the state could, by indictment, prosecute the
"proprietors" of the railroad. 9 If the prosecution was successful,
a $5,000 fine was imposed, the proceeds of which were distributed to the decedent's survivors.40 Significantly, if there were no
survivors, no fine could be imposed. 41 The issue in Gilmore was
whether the corporate entity or the individual stockholders were
the "proprietors" of the railroad, and therefore liable under the
statute.42 The Gilmore court held that the corporation was the
proper defendant, noting that the statute effectively prescribed a
civil tort action to be brought by the state on behalf of the decedent's survivors. 43 As such, Gilmore represented the furthest de34
35

Id. at 371.
Id. at 370. More specifically, Chief Justice Green noted:
It is true that there are crimes (perjury for example) of which a corporation cannot, in. the nature of things, be guilty. There are other crimes, as
treason and murder, for which the punishment imposed by law cannot
be inflicted upon a corporation. Nor can they be liable for any crime of
which a corrupt intent or malus animus is an essential ingredient.

Id.
Id. The Chief Justice emphasized that:
There is a strong reason, which does not seem to have been adverted to in the reported cases, why the corporation, and not the individual directors or laborers, should be indicted for the creation of a
nuisance. The principalobject of an indictment for a nuisance, is to compel
it to be abated; and regularly a part of the judgment upon conviction is,
that the nuisance be abated.
Id. (emphasis added).
37 24 N.H. 461 (1852).
38 See id. at 469-70.
39 Act of July 13, 1850, § 7, 1850 N.H. Acts 928.
40 See id.
41 Gilmore, 24 N.H. at 471.
42 Id. at 469.
43 See id. at 471. The Gilmore court stated:
36
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gree to which nineteenth century courts were willing to extend
corporate criminal liability for wrongful death. '
B.

The Development of Criminal Liability for Corporate Manslaughter:
1900-1960.

In 1900, a Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth v. Punxsutawney St. Passenger Railway"4 addressed whether a corporation
could be indicted and punished for committing homicide.4 5
While recognizing the expansion of corporate criminal liability,
the court quashed the indictment and held that no precedent existed for imposing liability on a corporation for crimes of which
intent is an element of the offense.4 6 The court also held that the
criminal act of manslaughter by an agent was "so far ultra vires as
to contravene all accepted rules in the criminal law for making it
47
the act of the principal.""
In that same year a Canadian court, in Regina v. Great Western
Laundry Co.48 also declined to hold a corporation criminally liable
for manslaughter. 9 In that case, Gudrun Johnson, an employee
of the Great Western Laundry Company was fatally injured when
her skirt became caught on a rotating laundry machine shaft.5 °
Great Western was indicted for criminal manslaughter on the
grounds that the corporation had negligently failed to properly
The remedy, therefore, if the corporation is held answerable, would
be consistent with the general policy of the law, which makes corporations liable civilly for all negligence of their agents and servants; and it
would also be simple, easy, and effectual.
Id. at 472. See also State v. Manchester & L. R.R., 52 N.H. 528, 549 (1873) (holding
that prosecutions such as that in Gilmore were actually more akin to civil actions).
The use of indictments to recover fines for disbursement to a decedent's survivors
became quite common in New England in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
See, e.g., State v. Maine Cent. R.R., 77 Me. 244, 1 A. 673 (1885); State v. Maine
Cent. R.R., 76 Me. 357 (1884); State v. Grand Trunk Ry., 58 Me. 176 (1870); Commonwealth v. Boston & Me. R.R., 133 Mass. 383 (1882); Commonwealth v. Boston
& L. R.R., 126 Mass. 61 (1878); Commonwealth v. Fitchburg R.R., 120 Mass. 372
(1876); Commonwealth v. Fitchburg R.R., 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 189 (1865); Commonwealth v. Boston & W. R.R., 65 Mass. (11 Cush.) 512 (1853); Boston, C. & M.
R.R. v. State, 32 N.H. 215 (1855).
44 24 Pa. C. 25 (1900).
45 Id. at 25-26.
46 Id. at 26.
47 Id. "Ultra vires" is defined as "[alcts beyond the scope of the powers of a
corporation, as defined by its charter or laws of state of incorporation." BLAcK's
LAw DICTIONARY 1365 (5th ed. 1979).
48 13 Man. R. 66 (1900).
49 Id. at 71.
50 Id. at 66-67.
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shield the machine shaft. 5 1 The court, however, dismissed the
indictment for lack of precedent 52 and also because the corporation could not suffer imprisonment, the only prescribed penalty
for manslaughter at the time.53
In 1904, the Circuit Court of the Southern District of New
York in United States v. Van Schaick 54 set new precedent by holding
that a corporation could be indicted for manslaughter, even
though under the applicable statute it could not be punished for
the crime.55 In Van Schaick, the Knickerbocker Steamboat Company was the corporate owner of the steamboat "General Slocum" (Slocum).5 6 On June 15, 1904, a fire erupted on board the
Slocum, and approximately 900 people drowned in an attempt to
Id. at 67.
Id. at 72.
53 Id. at 73-74. Cf Regina v. Union Colliery Co., 7 B.C.R. 247 (Crim. App.
1900) (holding corporate entity could be indicted and punished by fine for criminal
negligence but not for manslaughter where negligence resulted in death of human
beings). Id. at 252-53. But see Rex v. East Crest Oil Co., 3 D.L.R. 535 (Alberta App.
Div. 1944). The East Crest Oil court, in holding a corporation criminally liable for
manslaughter, stated that:
There is no doubt that in substance if not in words, the charge here
is manslaughter and we surely are sufficiently advanced now to describe
an offence [sic] for what it is, and there would seem to be no good reason why a charge of manslaughter as such should not lie against a cor51

52

poration ....

Id. at 540-41.
54 134 F. 592 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904).
55 Id. at 602. The applicable statute provided in part:
Every captain, engineer, pilot, or other person employed on any
steamboat or vessel, by whose misconduct, negligence, or inattention to
his duties on such vessel, the life of any person is destroyed, and every
owner, inspector, or other public officer, through whose fraud, connivance, misconduct, or violation of law, the life of any person is destroyed, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter, and, upon conviction
thereof before any [c]ircuit [c]ourt of the United States, shall be sentenced to confinement at hard labor for a period of not more than ten
years.
Id. at 594 (citing Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 100, § 56, 16 Stat. 456 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1115 (1982))). The statute now provides for a $10,000 fine
as an alternative to imprisonment and contains this additional provision:
When the owner or charterer of any steamboat or vessel is a corporation, any executive officer of such corporation, for the time being actually charged with the control and management of the operation,
equipment, or navigation of such steamboat or vessel, who has knowingly and willfully caused or allowed such fraud, neglect, connivance,
misconduct, or violation of law, by which the life of any person is destroyed, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1115 (1982).
56 134 F. at 594.
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escape the flames. 57 The company was indicted for manslaughter
for failing to provide, in violation of federal law, either proper
lifesaving or firefighting equipment. 58 A number of individual directors and officers were accused of complicity in the alleged
manslaughter.5 9 These individuals argued, however, that they
could not be held liable for complicity because the corporation
could not be convicted of the substantive offense.6" The Circuit
Court judge rejected this argument, holding that the corporation
could be convicted of the offense even though it could not suffer
the punishment of "confinement at hard labor for a period of not
more than ten years." 61 Thejudge further noted that under the
statute there was no need to prove intent to kill.6 2
Five years later the United States Supreme Court, in the
landmark case of New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v.
United States, 63 held that corporations could be indicted for the
acts of their agents without offending constitutional notions of
due process.6 4 Justice Day, writing for the court, drew an analogy
between corporate civil and criminal liability. 6 5 The Justice
noted that corporations were already civilly liable for the wrongful acts of their agents "because the act is done for the benefit of
57

Id.

58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 602.

61 Id. at 594, 602. Judge Thomas reasoned:
Is it to be concluded, simply because the given punishment cannot be
enforced, that Congress intended to allow corporate carriers by sea to

kill their passengers through misconduct that would be a punishable offense if done by a natural person? A corporation can be guilty of causing death by its wrongful act. It can with equal propriety be punished in
a civil or criminal action. It seems a more reasonable alternative that
Congress inadvertently omitted to provide a suitable punishment for the
offense, when committed by a corporation, than that it intended to give
the owner impunity simply because it happened to be a corporation.
Id. at 602.
62 Id. Judge Thomas explained:
The statute makes the owner's "fraud, misconduct, connivance or violation of law," causing death, an offense. In this case the duty of supplying proper life preservers is commanded by the law. This affirmative
command involves another command-that life preservers not in compliance with the law shall not be furnished. The corporation navigated
without them, and caused death thereby. It is not necessary to show
intention to kill, nor malice in fact.
Id.
63 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
64 Id. at 493.
65 See id. at 494.
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the principal." 66 He asserted that "we go only a step farther in
holding that the act of the agent, while exercising the authority
delegated to him ...

may be controlled, in the interest of public

policy, by imputing his act to his employer and imposing penalties upon the corporation for which he is acting."'67 Justice Day
further held that a corporation could be liable for an intent
crime, reasoning that an agent's intent could be imputed to the
corporation.

68

. After the New York Central decision, state courts followed a
meandering course in their consideration of corporate criminal
liability for homicide. 69 Two states declined to impose criminal
liability on corporations for homicide on purely statutory
grounds. 70 In People v. Rochester Railway & Light Co. ,7'the court

held that New York's homicide statute did not apply to corporations.72 In Rochester Railway, the corporation was indicted for
manslaughter on the grounds that its agent had negligently installed a device in a residence, resulting in the death of a person. 7' The Rochester Railway court, while citing the rationale of
New York Central with approval, 4 nevertheless declined to hold
the corporation liable. 75 The court observed that the New York
homicide statute defined homicide as "the killing of one human
being by the act, procurement or omission of another.

' 76

The

court determined that the legislature's use of the words "human
Id. at 493.
Id. at 494.
Id. at 493. Justice Day cited a noted treatise as persuasive authority:
Since a corporation acts by its officers and agents their purposes, motives, and intent are just as much those of the corporation as are the
things done. If, for example, the invisible, intangible essence of air,
which we term a corporation, can level mountains, fill up valleys, lay
down iron tracks, and run railroad cars on them, it can intend to do it,
and can act therein as well viciously as virtuously.
Id. at 492-93 (quotingJ. BisHop, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 255-56
(8th ed. 1892)).
69 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W. 459
(1913); State v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd
on reheaing,94 NJ.L. 171, 111 A. 257 (N.J. 1920); People v. Rochester Ry. & Light
Co., 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909).
70 See Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W. 463; People v.
Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909). See also infra notes 7185 and accompanying text.
71 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909).
72 Id. at 108, 88 N.E. at 24.
73 Id. at 103-04, 88 N.E. at 22.
74 Id. at 106-07, 88 N.E. at 23-24.
75 Id. at 108, 88 N.E. at 24.
76 Id. at 107, 88 N.E. at 24 (citation omitted).
66
67
68
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being" and "another" meant that only "another human being"
could commit homicide. 7 The court noted in dicta, however,
that given a differently worded statute, a corporation could be
held accountable for criminal homicide.78
In Commonwealth v. Illinois CentralRailroad,79 a Kentucky court
similarly declined to hold corporations criminally liable for homicide absent a clear statutory mandate. In that case a corporation
was indicted for involuntary manslaughter after one of its employees, a railroad engineer, negligently ran a locomotive at excessive speed into another railroad car, resulting in the death of a
passenger.8" The lower court dismissed the indictment, and the
commonwealth appealed.8
The reviewing court determined that corporations generally
cannot be held liable for intent crimes.8 2 The court asserted that
involuntary manslaughter, as defined by common law, involved
"a killing by one person of another person, 's 3 and as such, "it
would ...be giving the word 'person' a tortured meaning to say
that it include[d] a corporation."8 4 The court noted in dicta,
however, that "if authorized by a statute including corporations"
an indictment might be sustainable for degrees of homicide not
requiring actual intent.8 5
77 Id. at 108, 88 N.E. at 24. The court stated that it did not "discover any evidence of an intent on the part of the Legislature to abandon the limitation of its
enactments to human beings or to include a corporation as a criminal." Id.
78 Id. at 107, 88 N.E. at 24.
79 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W. 459 (1913).
80 Id. at 321, 153 S.W. at 460.
81 Id.

Id. at 323, 153 S.W. at 461. The court distinguished prosecution of corporations for intent crimes, the purpose of which is to punish the corporation, from
prosecutions for the wrongful death of a human being, the purpose of which is to
recover a fine for distribution to the decedent's survivors. Id. at 328, 153 S.W. at
463. The court noted:
While the tendency of the later cases isto extend the doctrine of corporate, civil liability for torts involving personal violence to criminal prosecutions, in most states in which that has been done, the indictments
provided for are designed mainly to furnish a civil remedy in favor of the
estate of the deceased, although in the form of a criminal action; therefore the decisions in those states are of little importance in determining
the question before us.
Id. at 328, 153 S.W. at 463. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
83 Id. at 324, 153 S.W. at 462.
84 Id. at 325, 153 S.W. at 461-62.
85 Id. at 328, 153 S.W. at 463. Cf. Rex v. Cory Bros., I K.B. 810 (1927) (holding
that corporations cannot be indicted for any crime which requires a mens rea, including manslaughter, even given a statute providing for the indictment of
corporations).
82
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Four years later, in State v. Lehigh Valley Railroad,8 6 a New
Jersey court expressly held that corporations could be indicted
and punished by fine for involuntary manslaughter.8 7 Justice
Swayze, writing for the supreme court, determined that there was
nothing "in the nature of the crime, the character of the punishment prescribed therefor, or the essential ingredients of the
crime, which [made] it impossible" to hold a corporation criminally liable for manslaughter. 88 The court distinguished its decision from Rochester Railway and Illinois Central, noting that those
decisions were "based entirely upon the construction of the exact
language of the penal code." 8 9 Instead, Justice Swayze implied
that the common law definition of manslaughter was broad
enough to encompass a corporation.9 0 Justice Swayze further asserted that he was "not troubled by" the lack of legal precedent
regarding the imposition of corporate liability, stating the indictment was "in harmony with established legal principles."9 "
Almost fifty years after Lehigh Valley, an Oregon court de86 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd, 94 N.J.L. 171, 111 A. 257
(N.J. 1920).
87 90 N.J.L. at 376, 103 A. at 686.
88 Id. at 373-74, 103 A. at 685-86.
89 Id. at 375, 103 A. at 686.
90 Id. at 374-75, 103 A. at 686. NewJersey's definition of homicide at the time of
the Lehigh Valley decision appears to have been first expounded in State v. Zellers, 7
N.J.L. 220 (Sup. Ct. 1824) as "where a person kills another upon a sudden transport of passion or heat of blood, upon a reasonable provocation, and without malice." Id. at 243. Justice Swayze, however, did not cite this definition in his opinion,
instead relying on a broader definition provided by Blackstone:

Blackstone . . . defines felonious homicide as "the killing of a human

creature, of any age or sex, without justification or excuse." He then
adds by way of illustration: "This may be done either by killing one's
self, or another man." Blackstone does not say that these are the only
cases of felonious homicide; as far as his text goes, the case of involuntary manslaughter by a corporation aggregate is not excluded, and is
within the words of his definition. But if we assume, as is probably the
fact, that Blackstone did not have in mind the case of involuntary manslaughter by a corporation aggregate as a possible case of felonious
homicide, nevertheless, his illustration of suicide as a felonious homicide shows that the definition relied upon (killing of one human being
by another human being) is inaccurate.
Id. at 375, 103 A. at 686 (citation omitted).
91 Lehigh Valley, 90 N.J.L at 376, 103 A. at 686 (citing Regina v. Great Western
Laundry Co., 13 Man R. 66 (1900), discussed supra notes 48-53 and accompanying
text). Id. There have only been three New Jersey opinions reported subsequent to
Lehigh Valley concerning indictments of corporations for manslaughter: State v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 16 N.J. Super. 360, 84 A.2d 650 (App. Div. 1951), aff d 9 N.J.
194, 87 A. 2d 709 (1952) (assuming without comment that corporation could be
indicted for manslaughter); State v. Central R.R., 102 N.J.L. 475, 133 A. 68 (Sup.
Ct. 1926); State v. Pennsylvania R.R., 3 N.J. Misc. 687, 129 A. 479 (Sup. Ct. 1925)
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clined to hold a corporation criminally liable for manslaughter on
statutory grounds in State v. Pacific Powder Co.92 In Pacific Powder,
the defendant's employee parked a truck containing six and onehalf tons of explosives.9 3 While the truck was unattended, an adjacent wooden building caught fire. 94 The heat from the fire
caused the truck to explode, resulting in the death of a bystander.9 5 A grand jury returned an indictment for manslaughter
against Pacific Powder Company.9 6 The state supreme court affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing the indictment, holding that a corporation was not a person within the meaning of the
Oregon manslaughter statute.97 The court noted, however, that
given a properly drafted statute a corporation could be indicted
for manslaughter. 8
C.

The Modern Cases: 1974-1988.

Thirteen years after Pacific Powder, New York had an opportunity to reconsider its earlier position on criminal liability of
corporations for homicide in People v. Ebasco Services, Inc.99
Ebasco Services, Inc., along with several co-defendants, was responsible for the construction of an extension to a generating
station located along the East River in Astoria, New York.' 0 0 Defendant Spearin, Preston & Burrows, Inc. had constructed a cofferdam in the East River to allow workers to perform certain
01 The coffertasks necessary to the project on the river bottom.'
0 2
workmen.'
two
killing
dam collapsed, however,
The defendants were charged with criminally negligent
homicide. 10 3 The defendants moved for dismissal, asserting
among other things, that corporations were not indictable for
(both dismissing indictments against corporations where no corporate negligence
had been shown).
92 226 Or. 502, 360 P.2d 530 (1961).
93 Id. at 503, 360 P.2d at 530.
94 Id., 360 P.2d at 530.

95 Id., 360 P.2d at 530.
96 Id. at 502-03, 360 P.2d at 530.
97 Id. at 507-08, 360 P.2d at 532.

98 Id. at 505-06, 360 P.2d at 531-32.
99 77 Misc. 2d 784, 354 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
100 Id. at 785, 354 N.Y.S. 2d at 809.
101 Id. A cofferdam is "a temporary watertight enclosure (as of piles packed with

clay or of metal plates) from which the water is pumped to expose the bottom of a
body of water and permit construction (as of foundations or piers). WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

439 (1986).

102 Ebasco, 77 Misc. 2d at 785, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
103 Id.

390

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18:378

criminally negligent homicide.' 0 4 In the interim between the
Rochester Railway and Ebasco decisions, however, New York enacted a new statute which the court determined would allow the
prosecution of a corporation for homicide.'0 5 Despite this enactment, the court dismissed the indictment on other grounds.'
Similarly, a Kentucky court in 1980, noting changes in statutory law since Commonwealth v. Illinois Central Railroad was decided
in 1913, held that a corporation could be indicted for manslaughter in Commonwealth v. FortnerL.P. Gas Co. 107 Fortner L.P. Gas Co.
was indicted after its employee, unable to stop his truck due to
defective brakes, caused the death of a schoolchild.10 8 The court
noted numerous Kentucky statutes through which "the legislature manifested its clear intention in regard to corporate responsibility."' 1 9 The court determined that "[t]aken collectively,
104 Id. at 786, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 810. The defendants also contended that the statute under which they were indicted, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 1975),
was unconstitutionally vague; that the indictment did not adequately particularize
the acts which were the basis for the alleged crime; and that the evidence presented
to the grand jury was legally insufficient. Ebasco, 77 Misc.2d at 786, 354 N.Y.S.2d at
810.
105 Id. at 787, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 811. The court held that "[t]he killing of a human
being by a corporation is an act that can be proscribed by the Legislature." Id. at
786, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 810 (citing People v. Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 195 N.Y. 102,
107, 88 N.E. 22, 24 (1909)). The court then noted that the applicable statute provided that "[a] person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal
negligence, he causes the death of another person." Id. (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.10 (McKinney 1975)). The court observed that while the Penal Law defined
"person" as "a human being who has been born and is alive," with reference to
homicide victims, the statute provided no specific definition regarding the perpetrator of a homicide. Id. at 786-87, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.05(1) (McKinney 1975)). The court therefore looked "to the broader definition of'person' contained in the over-all definitional article of the Penal Law." Id.
at 787, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 811. " 'Person' means a human being, and where appropriate,
a public or private corporation .. " N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(7) (McKinney 1975)
[emphasis added]. The court determined that this definition, coupled with the
Rochester Ry. dicta which suggested that corporations could be held criminally liable
for homicide given a statutory mandate, provided evidence of a legislative intent to
punish corporations for homicide. Ebasco Serv. Inc., 77 Misc. 2d at 787, 354
N.Y.S.2d at 811.
106 Id. at 788, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 812. The court determined that the indictment
failed to sufficiently particularize the facts constituting the alleged crime. Id., 354
N.Y.S.2d at 812.
107 610 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 942-43. In particular, the court examined Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 500.080 (12) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986) (providing that "person" includes, where appropriate, corporations); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 502.050
(Michie/Bobbs-Merr ill 1985) (providing for corporate criminal liability in certain
contexts); Ky. REV. STAT, ANN. § 534.050 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (providing
for imposition of fines on corporations for criminal offenses); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
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these statutes are clearly the type envisioned by the court in Commonwealth v. Illinois Central R. R. . . . when it said that an indictment might lie if authorized by statute."' 10
In People v. Warner-Lambert Co.,'" a corporation was indicted
along with several of its officers and employees after an explosion
in one of its factories killed six workers." 12 The indictment, however, was dismissed because the court discerned "no proof sufficient to support a finding that defendants foresaw or should have
foreseen the physical cause of the explosion.""II Acknowledging
the distinction between civil and criminal liability, the court declined to impose criminal liability absent evidence that the defendant's actions directly caused the deaths." 4 The court further
recognized that the standard of causation in criminal cases was
greater than that in a civil matter." 5
State v. Ford Motor Co.,"'16 an unreported but well- publicized
case, arose from the death of three teenage girls after their 1973
Ford Pinto exploded when struck in the rear by another vehicle. 11 7 A grand jury indicted the Ford Motor Company for reckless homicide on the theory that the corporation recklessly failed
to recall the defectively designed automobiles in a timely fashion.' ' Ford moved pre-trial to dismiss the indictment, arguing
inter alia that Indiana's reckless homicide statute was unconstitutional as applied to corporations as it was violative of due process. 1 19 The court, however, denied the motion, holding that the
Indiana statute was not unconstitutionally vague 2 0 and that it
§ 507.040 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (providing in part that "persons" can commit manslaughter).
110 Id. at 943. See also Commonwealth v. McIlwain School Bus Lines, 283 Pa.
Super. 1,423 A.2d 413 (1980), which held that a corporation could be indicted for
manslaughter, noting similar changes in the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. Id. at 14,
21, 423 A.2d at 419, 423 (distinguishing Commonwealth v. Punxsutawney St. Passenger Ry., 24 Pa. C. 25 (1900), discussed supra notes 44-47 and accompanying
text).
111 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1980).
112 Id. at 299, 414 N.E.2d at 661, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 160.
113 Id. at 305, 414 N.E.2d at 665, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
114 Id. at 306, 414 N.E.2d at 666, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 165.
115 Id. See also People v. Deitsch, 97 A.D.2d 327, 470 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1983) (assuming without comment that corporations could be indicted for manslaughter).
116 No. 5324 (Ind. Sup. Ct. filed Mar. 13, 1980).
117 See Maakestad, State v. Ford Motor Co.: Constitutional, Utilitarianand Moral Perspectives, 27 St. Louis U.L.J. 857, 859 (1983).
118 Id.
"19 State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324, slip op. at 7 (Ind. Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 2,
1979).
120 Id. at 9.
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provided sufficient notice of its applicability to corporations.' 2'
The case subsequently went to trial, at which the corporation was
22
acquitted.
In 1983, two states again questioned the susceptibility of
corporations to indictment for homicide with sharply conflicting
results. 2 3 In Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 1 24 a Texas court declined to hold a corporation criminally liable for manslaughter.12 5 In that case, a jury convicted a corporation of
manslaughter for causing, through two of its employees, the
death of two individuals in a motor vehicle accident. 26 The
Texas Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. 127 The court
discerned no legislative intent to punish corporations within the
statutory language defining homicide, reasoning that a corporation could not formulate the necessary state of mind to commit
28
all degrees of the crime.
Later that year, the California Court of Appeal refused to
Id. at 12.
Verdict, State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 11-431 (Ind. Cir. Ct. Mar. 13, 1980).
Compare Granite Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 197
Cal. Rptr. 3 (Ct. App. 1983) with Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd and remanded, 737 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)
(en banc).
124 Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd and
remanded, 737 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc).
125 Id. at 679.
126 Id. at 677.
127 Id. at 679.
128 Id. at 678. The court reached this conclusion despite the state penal code's
specific inclusion of corporations within its definition of "person," and that the
code defined criminally negligent homicide as occurring when "[a] person... causes
the death of an individual by criminal negligence." Id. at 678 (citing TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(2)(27); 19.07(a) (Vernon 1974)). The court, however, noted
that a reading of the code which always included corporations as "persons" would
lead to absurdities that legislature could not have intended, such as corporations
being held criminally liable for escape from confinement, rape, prostitution, abuse
of corpses, and smoking tobacco. Vaughan & Sons, 649 S.W.2d at 678. As such, the
court "look[ed] to the legislative intent in relation to each category of crime." Id.
The court determined that as "all the degrees of homicide, including criminally
negligent homicide, [were] together in one unit," the legislature must have "intended these to be different degrees of the same crime." Id. The court could find
"no indication in the wording of the statute or elsewhere that the type of individual
capable of committing homicide varies with the degree of culpability." Id. at 67879. Therefore, the court held that "person" did not include "corporation" in this
instance because corporations are incapable of crimes requiring intent, knowledge,
or recklessness. Id. at 679.
But cf. Lynch v. Port of Houston Auth., 671 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(assuming, without comment, that corporations could be held criminally liable for
homicide). The Lynch case was a civil action for wrongful death against a public
entity, but the court made reference in its opinion to a prior criminal action arising
121
122
123
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exempt a corporation from criminal liability for manslaughter in
Granite Construction Co. v. Superior Court.129 In Granite Construction,
seven workers died in an accident on a power plant project. 3 '
The Granite Construction court distinguished its holding from
Vaughan & Sons, noting first that the two states defined manslaughter differently, and second that California
had historically
3
prosecuted corporations for intent crimes.' '
A fire at the Great Adventure amusement park in Jackson,
New Jersey, 132 gave rise to yet another criminal prosecution of a
corporation for homicide. On May 11, 1984, fire erupted inside
Great Adventure's Haunted Mansion attraction, resulting in the
death of eight patrons. 33 Following an investigation by the
Ocean County Prosecutor's Office, 3 4 a grand jury indicted Great
Adventure, Inc., its parent, Six Flags Corporation, as well as two
135
executives, for manslaughter and aggravated manslaughter.
Later that year, the corporate defendants moved to dismiss the
indictment on the grounds that the definition of manslaughter
contained in the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice was not
13 7
1 36
The court denied the motion,
applicable to corporations.

out of the same incident to which the Port of Houston Authority had pleaded nolo
contendere. Id. at 959.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals later reversed the decision of the Court
of Appeals in Vaughan & Sons and remanded the case for consideration of other
issues raised by the defendant on appeal. Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 737
S.W.2d 805, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc). See infra notes 139-47 and
accompanying text.
129 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1983).
130 Id. at 466, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
13 Id. at 471-72, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 7-8. The court noted:
Although corporations in Texas may not be capable of forming "intent" or possess a "condition of the mind," California corporations can
form intent, be reckless and commit acts through their agents. The
criminal intent problem has not been squarely addressed, but corporations have been prosecuted for crimes of specific intent under the California Penal Code.
Id. at 472, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 8 (citations omitted).
132 Asbury Park Press, May 12, 1984, at 1, col. 4.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1, col. 6.
135 Indictment, State v. Six Flags Corp., (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. filed Sept. 14,
1984).
136 Transcript of Proceedings at 3-19, State v. Six Flags Corp., No. 1-0650-9-84
(N.J. Super. December 3, 1984) [hereinafter TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS]. Specifically, the defense argued that
Section 179 of the Penal Code, defines homicide as "the killing of one
human being by the act, procurement or omission of another." We
think that the final word, another, naturally and clearly means a second
or additional member of the same kind or class alone referred to by the
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both corporaand the case ultimately proceeded to trial where
3 8
tions were acquitted of all charges by a jury.
In September 1987, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas,
sitting en banc, reversed and remanded the decision of the Court
of Appeals in Vaughn & Sons, Inc. v. State. 13 9 PresidingJudge Onion, writing for the majority, held that the state legislature clearly
intended to impose criminal liability on corporations for negligent homicide. 4 ' The court reasoned that the statute defining
the offense used the word "person" rather than "individual," and
thus incorporated the Penal Code's general definition of "per[W]e should not
preceding words, namely, another human being ....
interpret it as Appellant asks us to as meaning another "person" which
may then include corporations. . . . [W]e construe this definition of
homicide as meaning the killing of one human being by another human
being.
Id. at 4.
The defense further argued that the holding of State v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 90
N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685 (1917), aff'd, 94 N.J.L. 171, 111 A. 257 (1920) (see supra
notes 87-94 and accompanying text) should no longer apply, as the New Jersey
Code of Criminal Justice, enacted in 1979, defined manslaughter differently than
the common law, upon which Lehigh Valley was decided. TRANSCRIPr OF PROCEEDINGS supra, at 6-7. The code provides that "A person is guilty of criminal homicide if
he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or, under the circumstances set forth in section
2C: 11-5, causes the death of another human being." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:I 1-2.a
(West 1982) [emphasis added]. The next subsection indicates that "[c]riminal
homicide is murder, manslaughter, or death by auto." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:I 1-2.b
(West 1982) [emphasis added].
137 TRANSCRIPr OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 136, at 19-36. The State contended
that the Lehigh Valley case was still good law, despite the change in the definition of
manslaughter:
[We] believe the statute was not meant to change [the Lehigh Valley holding]. In fact, the commentary to the statute stated the phrase "another
human being," and again [we] differ with the defense, "another human
being" was used instead of "another person" [because] .... [t]he Court
did not want to or the revision committee did not want to incorporate
fetal termination into our homicide statute and thus use the term "another human being" instead of "another person."
Id. at 21. Judge Blake agreed with the State's interpretation, adding:
[I]n view of the fact that the word "person" is susceptible to more
than one definition, I believe that is the reason the word [sic] "another
human being" was placed in the statute. In addition to which, other
than a fetus which is discussed in some of the cases, I don't know of any
other "person" other than "another human being" that can be a victim
of a criminal homicide.
Id. at 33-34. Justice Blake concluded by stating that "[tihis court is satisfied that it
should not adopt the very restrictive interpretation submitted by the defendants in
this case." Id. at 34.
138 N.Y. Times, July 21, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
139 737 S.W.2d 805, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc).
140 Id. at 811.
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son" which included corporations.' 4 ' The court further noted
strict construction of penal statthat common law rule requiring
42
utes did not apply in Texas.

Judge Teague dissented, arguing that "[t]he majority opinion actually does absolutely nothing to clear the air in this area of
law," which the judge termed "one big mess."'143 Judge Teague
would have held that the state had not properly alleged criminally negligent homicide against the corporation, and alterna44
tively, that the statute unconstitutionally violated due process. 1
Id. at 810. The court observed that certain offenses, such as bigamy and incest, do not apply to corporations because the actor is defined as an "individual"
rather than a "person." Id. at 810 n.15 (citation omitted).
142 Id. at 810 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.05(a) (Vernon 1974)). The
relevant statute provides in part:
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to
this code. The provisions of this code shall be construed according to
the fair import of their terms, to promote justice and effect the objectives of the code.
TEX PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.05(a) (Vernon 1974). Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:1-2.c
(West 1982), which provides rules of construction without mentioning "strict construction." The strict construction rule, however, is still recognized in New Jersey.
See State v. Maguire, 84 N.J. 508, 514 n.6, 423 A.2d 294, 297 n.6 (1980); see also
State v. Reed, 183 N.J. Super. 184, 192, 443 A.2d 744, 749 (App. Div. 1982) ("Due
process demands that penal statutes be strictly construed.").
Judge Clinton concurred, asserting that the imposition of criminal liability for
homicide on corporations was within the police power of the Legislature. Vaughan
& Sons, Inc., 737 S.W.2d at 814-15 (Clinton, J., concurring). Judge Clinton acknowledged the dissent's contention that the statute as applied imposes strict liability upon corporations for the acts of their agents, but noted that such liability was
supported by precedent. Id. at 815 (Clinton, J., concurring) (citing American Plant
Food Corp. v. State, 587 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)).
143 Id. at 815 (Teague, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 822 (Teague, J., dissenting). Judge Teague asserted that the State failed
to allege in the information the acts of negligence it intended to rely upon to establish criminal negligence, but rather
only alleged in this information that the accused corporation committed
the offense of "criminal negligence." Without more, this accusation is
totally insufficient to accuse the appellant corporation with committing
the criminal wrong of criminally negligent homicide .... And, there is no
more.
Id. at 817 (citations omitted). Judge Teague suggested that under the majority's
interpretation of the criminally negligent homicide statute, corporations could be
held liable for imputed misconduct which they were helpless to avoid:
Under § 7.22(a)(1), when does a private corporation in Texas know
that it committed a criminal wrong? The answer is easy. Much like one
who has been struck by lightning will know, the corporation will know
exactly at the moment in time when a trier of fact returns a verdict implicitly or expressly stating that because the corporation's employees or
agents were found to have personally committed a misdemeanor offense, which it has now determined to be criminal, the corporation is to
be strictly and automatically criminally liable for committing that wrong.
141

396

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18:378

Judge Teague observed that the majority was, in effect, upholding the imposition of strict criminal liability upon a corporation
for the acts of its agents. 145 The judge criticized this holding,
asserting that it freed the legislature to enact other statutes imputing "criminally negligent activity by a third person who is
under the control of another individual or person, such as a parent."' 14 6 Judge Teague suggested that "[i]f that is the law, then
7
14
the law is truly an ass."

In 1986, the State of Connecticut undertook a criminal prosecution of a corporation for negligent homicide in State v. P.G. P.
Industries, Inc. 148 The action arose from an incident at a P.G.P.
metal reclamation plant which resulted in an employee's death
from carbon monoxide poisoning.' 49 The State Attorneys' decision to prosecute the corporation, rather than any individuals,
was based on his theory that the action of a number of officers
and agents taken together amounted to "cumulative malfeasance."'"5 On February 8, 1988, however, a Connecticut Superior Court judge granted defendant's motion for a judgment of
acquittal at the close of the state's presentation of evidence at
trial, citing failure of proof.151
Id. at 818.
145 Id. Judge Teague further stated "that to strictly criminalize a private corporation doing business in Texas for the personal criminal acts of its employees or
agents, pursuant to § 7.22(a)(1), amounts to arbitrariness and nonsense." Id. at
819.
146 Id.
147 Id. Judge Teague warned that the majority opinion would have widespread
negative ramifications:
[G]et ready for things to come because you ain't seen nothing yet. Parents of negligent children, you may also get ready because once the
members of the Legislature have completely digested the majority opinion I predict it will not be long before a child's negligent acts, which are
later determined to be criminal by some trier of fact, will be imputed to
the child's parents, who are, at that instant in time, to be criminalized
solely because his, her, or their child committed a personal criminally
negligent act.
Id. at 820. Judge Teague also foresaw trial judges adopting "scarlet letter" style
punishments for convicted corporations, "such as requiring the corporation to
place on the sides of all its trucks such signs stating 'Killer corporation' or 'BEWARE-CAUTION: THIS CORPORATION HAS BEEN FOUND GUILTY OF
KILLING ANOTHER HUMAN BEING.'" Id. at 816.
148 No. CR4-123536 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 1988).
149 See English, Waterbury Prosecutor Takes on Corporationfor Workers' Death, Conn. L.
Tribune, Aug. 4, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
150 Id. at 8, cols. 3-4.
151 Transcript of Proceedings at 54-55, State v. P.G.P. Industries, Inc., No. CR4123536 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 1988).
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ANALYSIS

A number of courts have held that corporations may be
criminally liable for homicides arising from the wrongful acts of
their agents. 15 2 The authority relied on by these courts has held
corporations criminally liable by analogy to tort law. 153 As a corporation is an entity which is legally distinct from its shareholders
and agents,' 54 a question remains as to the social utility of prosecuting the corporate entity in addition to, or instead of, corporate agents. 155 An answer to this question must address two
issues: whether the objectives of criminal law and tort law are
similar enough to warrant analogy, and more importantly,
whether criminal prosecution of corporations for homicide
serves those objectives.
A.

The Distinct Policy Considerations Underlying Civil and Criminal
Responsibility for Wrongful Death.

Justice Day wrote in New York Central that "we go only a step
farther" in applying the civil doctrine of respondeat superior to
criminal law.' 5 6 Justice Day's simple analogy, however, ignores
152 See, e.g., State v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1917),
aff'd after remand, 94 N.J.L. 171, 111 A. 257 (1920), discussed supra notes 86-91 and
accompanying text.
153 See New York Cent. & H. R. R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909), See also
supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
154 "Corporation" is defined as:
An artificial person or legal entity created by or under the authority
of the laws of a state or nation, composed, in some rare instances, of a
single person and his successors, being the incumbents of a particular
office, but ordinarily consisting of an association of numerous individuals. Such entity subsists as a body politic under a special denomination,
which is regarded in law as having a personality and existence distinct
from that of its several members ....
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 307 (5th ed. 1979). See also Note, CorporatePersonality -A
FunctionalApproach,23 UNIV. PITr. L. REV. 172 (1961) (observing that a corporation
is a separate entity from its shareholders).
,155 See infra notes 179-88 and accompanying text. See also Maakestad, supra note
117, at 878-80 (discussing the deterrent effect of corporate criminal sanctions).
156 New York Cent., 212 U.S. at 494. "Respondeat superior" is a principle invoked
where
by reason of some relation existing between A and B, the negligence of A is to be charged against B, although B has played no part in
it, has done nothing whatever to aid or encourage it, or indeed has done
all that he possibly can to prevent it.
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 458 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]. PROSSER has noted that "[t]he
most familiar illustration, of course, is the liability of a master for the torts of his
servant in the course of his employment." Id. at 499-500.
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the distinct purposes of tort and criminal law. 15 7 Nevertheless,
many courts have cited New York Central with approval, suggesting
that "[a]nomalies in the law . . . sometimes arise from blindly

' 58
following the hasty decision of a distinguished judge."'
The doctrine of respondeat superior has long been recognized in tort law.' 59 The rationale behind the doctrine, however,
is somewhat difficult to discern. Prosser has catalogued a
number of possible justifications but concludes that the "modern
justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate
allocation of a risk."' 6 Costs of risk are imposed on employers,
even if not personally at fault, generally because they are better
able to bear them than an injured plaintiff.' 6 ' The employer, by
absorbing the risk through higher prices or insurance, passes
and distributes
the risk to society at large as a cost of doing
62

business. 1

As the primary purpose of tort law is compensation of victims, respondeat superior is useful in this regard. 16

If victims

could only bring suit against an employee or agent of a company,
the victim's compensation would be limited to the personal financial resources of that individual. More adequate compensation
may be obtained from the employer, the "deep
pocket" who
164
passes the costs of liability on to the consumer.
Conversely, as a general rule criminal law is not concerned
with compensation.' 65 The primary purpose of criminal law's pu157

Id. at 7-8. The purpose of a criminal prosecution is:
to protect and vindicate the interests of the public as a whole, by
punishing by eliminating, the offender from society, either permanently
or for a limited time, by reforming or rehabilitating, by teaching the
offender not to repeat the offense, or by deterring others from similar
conduct ...

[A] criminal prosecution is not concerned in any way with

compensation of the injured individual against whom the crime is committed, and the victim's only formal part in it is that of an accuser and a
witness for the state.
Id. at 7 (footnotes omitted). This treatise further asserts:
The civil action for a tort, on the other hand, is commenced and
maintained by the injured person, and its purpose is to compensate for
the damage suffered, at the expense of the wrongdoer.
Id.
158 Waydell v. Luer, 5 Hill 448, 453 (N.Y. 1843).
159 See PROSSER, supra note 156, at 500.
160 Id. (footnote omitted).
161 Id. at 500-01.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 7.
164 Id. at 500.
165 Id. at 7.
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nitive sanctions is to deter potential offenders from committing
crimes, notwithstanding the oft-recited goals of reformation, protection and vindication of the public interest. 66 Curiously, the
courts generally have addressed only whether corporations may
be held criminally liable for homicide, without discussing
whether they should be held liable. 67 While it is possible that
some courts may have been deferring such policy considerations
to the legislatures, others have clearly strained statutory language in order to hold corporations criminally liable. 168 Yet few
courts have stated policy considerations in support of their
69
decisions. 1
166 Id. See also Maakestad, supra note 117, at 874-80. Professor Maakestad commented with regard to State v. Ford Motor Co. that:
[c]orporate decision making that previously had been considered an
example of poor business judgment had been labeled as punishable
criminal conduct through an Indiana prosecutor's bold expression of
community sentiment. Although a jury chosen from a different community, following a change of venue, ultimately rendered a verdict of acquittal, the real significance of the prosecution was undiminished: local
people who had considered their moral boundaries transgressed had risen
up and expressed their outrage by requiring a corporation, like any
other person, to stand judgment before a criminal jury.
Id. at 877 (footnote omitted). This "bold expression of community sentiment" in
the Ford Motor Co. case may have been the prosecution's only significance, for as
Professor Maakestad observed later in his article:
Clearly, the attempt to place criminal responsibility upon Ford for
reckless homicide, an offense carrying a maximum penalty of only
$30,000 ($10,000 per count) under Indiana law, holds much greater import as a symbolic declaration of public morality than it does as an instrument by which to combat corporate crime effectively in the future.
Id. at 878 (footnote omitted).
167 See Mueller, supra note 5. Professor Mueller commented:
[w]hile the law of corporate criminal liability is easy to understand
or, for any given jurisdiction, easy to ascertain, the rationale of corporate criminal liability is all but clear. It is safe to say that, for the most
part, the law has proceeded without rationale whatsoever ....It simply
rests on the assumption that such liability is a necessary and useful
thing.
Id. at 23.
168 See, e.g. TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 136, at 19-36. See also supra,
notes 132-135 and accompanying text.
169 See infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text. See also NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL
LAW REVISION COMMISSION, THE NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE - VOLUME II: COMMENTARY (1971). The Commission's Commentary to § 2C:2-7 of the then proposed
Penal Code concerning liability of corporations noted that "[t]he modern development.., has proceeded largely without reference to any intelligible body of principle and the field is characterized by the absence of articulate analysis of the
objectives thought to be attainable by imposing criminal fines on corporate bodies." Id. at 64. The Legislature nevertheless enacted the provision. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:2-7 (West 1982).
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The early cases which held that corporations could be indicted for certain acts did set forth policy considerations, but deterrence of crime was not among them. 170 Rather, those
indictments were brought in order to compel a corporation
either to act or desist from an act.' 7 ' As such, the indictments
were more in the nature of a contempt action. 172 Likewise, the
line of cases which arose in New England in the late nineteenth
century imposing criminal liability on corporations for manslaughter were in substance civil suits more analogous to our
present day wrongful death actions. 173 In those cases, the prosecutor assumed the role of the decedent's personal representative. 174 The proceeds of any 7fine
recovered were distributed to
5
the decedent's surviving kin.'

Modern prosecutions of corporations for homicide seek
neither to compensate nor compel, but to punish and deter
crime. I7 6 Despite the dissimilar objectives of more recent cases,
courts have relied on the early cases as authority for the proposition that corporations can and should be punished for man170 See, e.g., State v. Morris & E. R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360 (Sup. Ct. 1852) (indictment
brought to compel a corporation to abate a nuisance); Regina v. Great N. of Eng.
Ry., 72 Rev. Rep. 262, 9 Q.B. 315 (1846) (indictment brought to compel corporation to repair a bridge); Regina v. Birmingham & Gloucester Ry., 61 Rev. Rep. 207,
3 QB. 223 (1842) (indictment brought to compel corporation to construct a
bridge).
171 See id.
172 E.g., N.J. CT. R. 1:10 (Contempt of Court and Enforcement of Litigant's
Rights Related Thereto).
173 See, e.g., State v. Gilmore, 24 N.H. 461 (1852) (prosecution of corporation for
manslaughter where proceeds of the fine were disbursed to the decedent's
survivors).
174 See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
175 See id.
176 See, e.g. State v. Six Flags Corp., (N.J. Super. filed Sept. 14, 1984) (No. 1-06509-84). Had the two corporations been convicted of manslaughter, the following
provision of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice would have been applicable:
a. The court may suspend the imposition of sentence of a corporation which has been convicted of an offense or may sentence it to pay a
fine of up to three times the fine provided for in section 2C:43-3 or
make restitution authorized by section 2C:43-3.
b. When a corporation is convicted of an offense or a high managerial
agent of a corporation, as defined in section 2C:2-7 is convicted of an
offense committed in conducting the affairs of the corporation, the court
may request the Attorney General to institute appropriate proceedings
to dissolve the corporation, forfeit its charter, revoke any franchises
held by it, or to revoke the certificate authorizing the corporation to
conduct business in this State.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-4 (West 1982).
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slaughter.'7 7 Likewise, legislatures have extended criminal
liability to corporate entities in apparent reliance on these early
cases, without discussion or comment as to the policy objectives
sought to be achieved. 7 8
B.

The Utility of Criminal Prosecutions of Corporate
Entities for Homicide

While a number of justifications for imposing criminal liability on corporations have been cffered, none are convincing. Deterrence of future corporate misconduct is one oft-cited
rationale. ' 79 It is argued that the threat of heavy fines and the
stigma of a criminal conviction help deter corporations from
practices that may result in the death of human beings. 180 There
are, however, two flaws in this analysis. First, the deterrent effect
of a fine on a corporation is illusory: unlike an individual, the
corporate entity can pass the fine along to the consumer as a cost
of doing business. 18 ' While some authors have suggested that
such a practice ultimately will result in the corporation suffering
financial hardship due to inability to compete in the marketplace,
1 82
any deterrence of this nature is indirect at best.
177 See, e.g. TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 136, at 31-34; State v. Lehigh
Valley R.R., 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685 (1917), aff'd afer remand, 94 N.J.L. 171, 111
A. 257 (1920).
178 See, e.g. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-7 (West 1982) (providing for the criminal liability of corporations and persons while acting on the corporation's behalf). See also
supra note 161 and accompanying text.
179 See, e.g., Maakestad, supra note 117. Maakestad argued that "the existence of
corporate criminal liability serves to encourage managers to exercise closer supervision of subordinates; individual liability alone would encourage just the opposite,
a 'don't tell me I'd rather not know' attitude at the top." Id. at 879. But cf Comment, Corporate Homicide: The Stark Realities of Artificial Beings and Legal Fictions, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 367, 407 (1981):

Yet the fact remains that corporations do not commit crimes people do, and thus it would seem more appropriate to proceed directly
against the individual perpetrator than the corporation as a whole.
While holding the entire corporate body criminally liable for acts of
reckless disregard for human life would be a dramatic improvement
over present liability schemes, punishment of' the particular individual
offenders by means of frequently imposed jail sentences, would provide
a better mechanism for deterrence.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
180 See Maakestad, supra note 117, at 879-80.
'81 Id. at 879.
182 See id. at 880. Professor Maakestad argued:
[a]ssuming there is competition in the convicted corporation's industry, prices cannot rise to absorb the fine. If this occurs, profits will go
down, debt and equity financing will become difficult, expansion will be
curtailed, and investors will look for a more law abiding corporation.
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Second, the deterrent rationale rests upon the assumption
that a corporate entity is capable of being deterred. 8 3 Such an
assumption ignores the ieality that a corporate entity has "no
pants to kick or soul to damn," notwithstanding one jurist's contention that "by God, it ought to have both!'

8 4

Concededly, the

law does treat the corporate entity as a'person for many purposes.' 8 5 Nevertheless, the fact remains that such personification
8 6
is a legal fiction, recognized for purposes of convenience.1
The corporation is owned by people, people make decisions
for the corporation, and people act on behalf of the corporation.
Therefore, any punitive effects of a corporate homicide prosecution will fall on people - shareholders, officers, directors and
employees. 8 7 Certainly, it cannot be seriously suggested that all
the individuals who would feel the impact of a conviction would
be culpable in any given case of corporate homicide. This is especially true when one considers that the composition of these
groups may very well change from the time of the alleged wrongful act until the time of conviction. These are the very people
who would suffer following the conviction of a corporation for
homicide. As such, prosecutions of corporate entities for homicide are overinclusive. Effective and fair deterrence can be attained through prosecution of individuals acting on behalf of the
corporation.
The contention that prosecution of the corporate entity provides a useful means by which the community can express its
moral outrage should be similarly dismissed. The use of a corporate entity as a legal scapegoat only serves to harm potentially
innocent people, a result inconsistent with our law's requirement
that guilt be proven "beyond a reasonable doubt."'8 8
Id. (footnote omitted). Professor Maakestad failed to recognize, however, that a
fine substantial enough to have these effects may also result in financial injury to
innocent parties, i.e., employees losing jobs and shareholders' devaluation of
stocks. See generally Comment, supra note 179, at 405-06.
183 See generally C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 3 (1975).
184 Id. (quoting H. MENCKEN, A NEW DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS ON HISTORICAL
PRINCIPLES FROM ANCIENT AND MODERN SOURCES 223 (1942)).
185 See generally Note, Corporate Personality- A FunctionalApproach,
REV.
186

23 U.

PITr.

L.

172, 173-74 (1961).
See supra note 154.

117, at 879.
188 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:l-13.a (West 1982), which provides in relevant
part: "No person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
187 See Maakestad, supra note
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CONCLUSION

The extension of criminal liability for homicide to corporations is no more than a legal non sequitur. The logic of the earliest corporate criminal indictment cases does not justify an
inference that a corporate entity, a legal fiction, is capable of being deterred from criminal conduct. Likewise, the concept cannot be supported by analogy to the tort law doctrine of
respondeat superior. As respondeat superior effectively distributes the costs of compensating the victim to consumers through
higher prices, imposing a fine on a corporation for tortious injury
only results in the cost of the fine being shared by society. Even
assuming a fine could be imposed that is so onerous that the corporation could not pass it along to consumers and still remain
competitive, the corporation's shareholders, and not the responsible individuals, would suffer in the form of reduced dividends
and depreciated stock values. The penalties 'exacted would
therefore have minimal deterrent effect as shareholders of large
corporations generally exercise little direct control over the actual operation of the enterprise.
Wrongful acts performed on behalf of a corporation that result in death cannot be condoned. A theory, however, of criminal
liability which stigmatizes all members of the organization, penalizing an innocent body of shareholders and having little deterrent effect on future misconduct, is not the answer. Rather,
prosecutorial efforts must be directed at punishing responsible
individuals, notwithstanding the argument that it is often difficult,
if not impossible, to identify these persons.' 8 9 The fact remains
that human beings control corporations. Punishing a creation of
189 See Edgerton, CorporateCriminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827 (1927). Professor Edgerton argued in support of extending criminal liability to corporations that:
In the first place, it may on occasion, be clear enough that some
individuals have committed a crime for corporate purposes, and yet not
clear who those individuals are. It is moreover relatively difficult to apprehend and prosecute a number, particularly a large number, of individuals, even if their identity is known; the corporation is always readily
available. And the individuals may be financially so irresponsible as to
have nothing to fear from a fine, while the assets of the corporation may
be abundant. Finally, juries - as has long been notorious in civil cases
- are not so reluctant to find corporations guilty as to find individuals
guilty.
Id. at 834 (footnotes omitted). If ease of prosecution is a legitimate ground for
imposing criminal liability on a corporation for homicide, perhaps the concept has
a place alongside "[clonspiracy, that darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery."
Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925). But cf Genesis 18:26: "If I
find at Sodom fifty righteous in the city, I will spare the whole place for their sake."
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law is meaningless; punishing those who control the entity, on
the other hand, may deter future misconduct on behalf of a corporate entity which results in death.
DavidJ. Reilly

